Graph 1: Life Expectency: South Africa 1910 to 2007

This in turn implies that resources are being correctly spent on the balance of prevention, comfort of the ill, sustaining the infected and the search for a cure or vaccine. For the correct actions to be taken, the correct policies need to be in place and fully implemented. And this is where South Africa has failed. The Mbeki administration’s denial policy and the failure of this policy are clearly visible in the first graph¹. Compared to fifteen years ago, the average South African can expect to live about twelve years less than his/her counterpart from the early 1990s. This is compounded by the fact that during the preceding ten years the average wealth of South Africans reduced as a result of sanctions, boycotts, etc.

A graph¹ provides a representation of the declining life expectancy in South Africa in a clear and unambiguous way, free from emotion and politicisation. Life expectancy peaked in the early nineties at around 60 years. Since then there has been a downward spiral that shows no sign of an upturn. This is despite the fact that GDP per capita growth has been strong over the last couple of years. In normal times this strong growth would be expected to be accompanied by a rise in life expectancy.

Graph 2: Life Expectency: South Africa vs. Uganda vs. Botswana

The hope is that the curve has bottomed out and this may be supported by the fact that StatsSA 2008 reported estimated life expectancy is slightly higher than the 2007 figure used in the graphs.

Botswana and Uganda have both put in place effective policies and are seeing the positive effects of those policies. Uganda has been known as a leader in the prevention of HIV/AIDS and has put in place effective policies that have reversed the declining life expectancy, to the extent that they are adding an extra year to their expected life expectancy every year. Botswana, through a number of medium term policy plans, has made similar strides, although it occurred later than Uganda. These reversals are very clearly seen in the second graph.

South Africa has a lot of catching-up to do. And if that catching up is not done, South Africa’s status in the world will decline along with its competitiveness.

Graph 3: Life Expectency: South Africa vs Peers (BRICSAM excluding ASEAN countries)

In contrast, South Africa’s peer group of countries (BRICSAM: Brazil, Russia, India, China and Mexico, and the ASEAN countries) have life expectancy rates that keep increasing and, with the exception of India, relatively small HIV/AIDS per capita infection rates and/or total HIV/AIDS infections. The economic implications are well documented and do not make comfortable reading from a South African perspective. It will be where South Africa’s international competitiveness will be severely compromised. South Africa and the BRICSAM countries will all be competing for the same business.

The real question is how the Zuma administration is going to respond to this issue. The first move he made by moving Barbara Hogan out of the Health Ministry was not very comforting. Jacob Zuma’s own history does not help to raise hopes that there will be an effective policy. If, and it’s only an impression, Jacob Zuma is the type of leader who allows his Ministers to get on with policy implementation, then we must hope that Aaron Motsoaledi turns out to be an extraordinary Health Minister. He has a mistake, and a huge historical deficit, to rectify with effective policy and implementation.

¹All graphs and data provided by Gapminder World and their data providers. Gapminder provides a way to see time-series data in a completely new way.

What size table will be needed for the enlarged Cabinet? (Svilen Mushkatov)

The USA has fifteen cabinet members plus an additional seven co-opted members who do not head up their own departments, but rather external agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency and the Office of the Vice President. Brazil has twenty three cabinet members (plus an additional nine cabinet level appointees, including head of the central bank and Chief of Staff). The UK has twenty three (plus half-a-dozen others).

Second impression is that their is a lot of ‘reward for support’ going on. Blade Nzimande, Ebrahim Patel and Fikile Mbalula all represent constituencies that played a large part in Zuma’s elevation to power. The old question is whether or not these three ministers (and others) are ‘fit-for-purpose’. Or is this another case where personal loyalty is more important than the good of the nation?

Third, why was Barbara Hogan moved from the Health Ministry? Is party disloyalty more important than efficiency of the health services? On the other hand, Aaron Motsoaledi and Molefi Sefularo are unknown quantities and unknown to most South Africans. Are they doctors? What qualifies them ahead of Barbara Hogan? Let’s give them time.

Fourth, Manual’s move into the Presidency and the creation of the National Planning Commission seems, on the surface, to be a way of appeasing the business community and the international world. But does it really? It smacks a little of communist style central planning bureaus.

Fifth, what is Pieter Mulder doing in the cabinet? Is this some pre-planning for the next election and a way of drawing the Afrikaner into the ANC fold? Or is it, cynically, a ruse that is to cover accelerated land reform that will require an insider to quell the angry farmers?

Sixth. Tokyo Sexwale. If he can bring a business overview and implementation focus to the provision of housing, he will have added tremendously to the ANC’s commitment to the electorate. The downside is that he does have large business holdings and even if he remains absolutely peachy clean, the sense of impropriety is only an whisper away. Will he resign his chairmanship of his own corporation so their can be no conflicts of interest?

Seventh and last: are the Education, Education, Energy and Mineral ministries going to result in the splitting of the respective departments? And the resultant creation of new top-level positions within the new departments? If so, they need to be very much more efficient than present. All this extra cost in a time of austerity is not going to go down well with the electorate.

Jacob Zuma, as is his nature, has tried to appease everyone with his appointments. The reality is that a large number of the ministers are new in the job, or have new and different responsibilities. We need to wait a while to see what they actually produce.